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INTRODUCTION
Despite the 2008–2009 recession, American metropolitan areas have
experienced tremendous growth.1 While demand for real estate in places
like New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., has exploded, the
housing stock in many of these popular regions has often failed to keep
pace.2 As a result, housing costs have dramatically increased, outpacing
the stagnant wage growth of low–income workers.3 Due to these economic
dynamics, entire metropolitan areas are becoming financially inaccessible
for low–income individuals.4 Consequently, local governments face
mounting pressure from both residents and business leaders to address this
affordability crisis by facilitating the creation of more accessible housing
options.5
1. See Claire Cain Miller, More New Jobs Are in City Centers, While Employment
Growth Shrinks in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/02/24/upshot/more-new-jobs-are-in-city-centers-while-employment-
growth-shrinks-in-the-suburbs.html (stating that well-paying jobs are increasingly
found in large urban centers, while working-class jobs are more predominantly located
in the outer suburbs). But see Alan Berube, Political Rhetoric Exaggerates Economic
Divisions Between Rural and Urban America, BROOKINGS (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/08/03/political-rhetoric-exaggerates-economic-
divisions-between-rural-and-urban-america/ (arguing that the divisions between rural
and urban economies are exaggerated and that the two are deeply intertwined).
2. See Mark Gimein, Why the High Cost of Big–City Living is Bad for Everyone,
NEWYORKER (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-the-
high-cost-of-big-city-living-is-bad-for-everyone (arguing that, despite decades of
conventional thinking regarding the inevitable demise of cities, a strong desire to
access high–paying jobs and urban amenities has fueled a wave of migration to a few
“imperial” urban in recent years); see also, Alexi Barrionuevo, Lack of New
Construction Pushes Bay Area to the Brink of a Bubble, CURBED (Feb. 24, 2016, 10:30
AM), http://www.curbed.com/2016/2/24/11102278/bay-area-housing-crisis-bubble
(explaining that despite the fact that 64,000 new jobs have been created in San
Francisco, less than 5,000 new homes have been constructed); Justin Fox, Sometimes a
Nimby Is a Just a Nimby, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ articles/2016-05-05/sometimes-a-nimby-is-a-just-a
-nimby (demonstrating local resistance’s view that new construction is selfish and
negatively impacts the communities, which explains why it has been so difficult to
construct new homes).
3. Home Prices Rising Faster than Wages: Report, CNBC (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:45
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/24/home-prices-rising-faster-than-wages-report.
html.
4. See Justin Fox, Urban Living Becomes a Luxury Good, BLOOMBERG (May 24,
2016, 1:32 PM), https://origin-www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-05-24/urban-
living-becomes-a-luxury-good (positing that living in urban centers is increasingly
becoming a luxury good, because high demand –– in conjunction with the tepid growth
in supply –– has fueled an intense rise in housing costs, which is making downtown
real estate an exclusive product only attainable for wealthy people).
5. See, e.g., Patrick Sisson, Why the Rent Is Too Damn High: The Affordable
Housing Crisis, CURBED (May 19, 2016, 12:47 PM), http://www.curbed.com/ 2016/5
/19/11713134/affordable-housing-policy-rent-apartments.
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In response, municipalities are implementing an array of solutions,
including programs that promote inclusionary housing.6 Inclusionary
housing is a mechanism that compels private stakeholders to engage in
otherwise economically irrational behavior.7 These inclusionary housing
programs encourage residential projects to provide some lower–cost
housing by creating a distinction between “affordable” and “market–rate”
dwellings.8 Furthermore, these programs may require participating
developers to build affordable units on the same street or floor as market–
rate units.9
Real estate developers are further motivated to participate in inclusionary
housing programs because they either provide business incentives or are an
unavoidable cost of constructing certain projects within a housing zone.10
However, developers still have the discretion to forgo the program’s
economic incentives or avoid building in the municipality if the regulations
are too onerous.11 Given this degree of discretion for developers, small
changes and uncertainty can upset this regulatory ecosystem by
discouraging developer participation en masse.12
To account for these various considerations, this Comment will analyze
Montgomery County’s Moderately Priced Dwelling Units (“MPDU”)
program, which is one of the first and most extensively implemented
inclusionary housing programs.13 Consequently, this analysis will provide
6. See, e.g., Brian Johnson, Here’s How DC’s Inclusionary Zoning Program
Works, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://ggwash.org/view /39157/
heres-how-dcs-inclusionary-zoning-program-works (discussing how DC’s inclusionary
housing program provides local residents with more affordable options).
7. See Jolie Milstein, Affordable Housing Will Only Work With For–Profit
Developers in the Mix, OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://observer.com/
2016/09/affordable-housing-will-only-work-with-for-profit-developers-in-the-mix/
(arguing that developers in New York City need a profit motive to build more
affordable housing).
8. See generally, Johnson, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., id. (discussing how New York’s poor door ban implemented such a
prohibition on housing separation in the context of apartment buildings).
10. See Scott Beyer, Inclusionary Housing Is Rent Control 2.0, FORBES (May 27,
2015, 3:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/05/27/inclusionary-
zoning-is-rent-control-2-0/#3b6dfe692c10 (arguing that inclusionary housing programs
reflect rent control in that they both function as an obligatory business expense for
developers).
11. Id.
12. See Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed: How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 471, 472–
73 (2005) (arguing that inclusionary zoning puts a high burden on private developers,
which can discourage participation under certain circumstances).
13. Andrew Rice, The Suburban Solution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/03/05/magazine/the-suburban-solution.html.
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some clarity to real estate professionals and help municipalities determine
the prudent regulatory path forward. To properly assess whether
Montgomery County’s inclusionary housing program violates the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”), Section II addresses: (1) the MPDU program’s
statutory structure and demographic context; (2) the relationship between
the FHA’s Doctrine of Disparate Impact and municipal zoning ordinances
such as Montgomery County’s MPDU program; (3) the legal standards for
bringing a disparate impact claim against a municipality for housing
discrimination; and (4) an alternative approach of housing separation
through New York’s 421–a program. Section III examines potential
avenues for bringing a FHA disparate impact claim under each the New
York’s 421–a program and the MPDU program. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the MPDU program is vulnerable to a housing
discrimination lawsuit and therefore should adopt the same street
stipulation –– a provision resembling New York’s 421–a program.
II. THEDEVELOPMENT OF INCLUSIONARYHOUSING PROGRAMS
In the 1960s, the government began to develop a way to provide housing
to low income individuals through a series of public housing initiatives.14
Unfortunately, this large–scale government intervention resulted in tragedy.
These idealistic housing projects often became uninhabitable havens for
drugs, crime, and violence.15
In response, the government adopted a more conservative and neo–
liberal approach in the 1970s and 80s.16 Many believed this hands–off
regulatory approach was a better solution to deal with systemic problems
such as high concentrations of poverty, weak funding, and housing projects
that are detached or segregated from urban life.17 Thus, instead of
14. Jamelle Bouie, How We Built the Ghettos, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 13, 2014, 2:40
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/13/how-we-built-the-ghettos.html
(discussing the construction of public housing projects in the context of racial
segregation).
15. See J.S., Why the Pruitt–Igoe Housing Project Failed, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15,
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/10/american-public-housing
(discussing the unhealthy and dangerous conditions in a St. Louis housing project).
16. See generally, Kiran Sandhu & Stanislaw Korzeniewski, The Impact of Neo–
Liberal Ideology on Housing Policy and Practice, 1 ITPI J. (2004) (explaining that
according to the 1980s neo–liberal housing approach, “[t]he state’s role in production,
ownership finance marketing and regulations should be rolled back and its activities
should be restricted to those of market enablement”).
17. See Jasmine Coleman, Why is America Pulling Down the Projects?, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35913577 (discussing the
pervasiveness of drugs and crime in D.C. housing projects due to neglect and planning
failures); see also Howard Husock, How Public Housing Harms Cities, CITY J.,
https://www.city-journal.org/html/how-public-housing-harms-cities-12410.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2017) (describing the differences between urban housing and
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engaging in direct intervention, the statutory initiatives created during that
time merely attempted to influence or control the behavior of private
actors.18
Current inclusionary housing regulations reflect this shift in housing
law.19 In general, inclusionary housing regulations function as a
government–sponsored effort to ensure that new residential development
includes affordable options.20 To comply, developers must set aside some
units to sell or rent at a reduced cost when constructing market–rate
apartments or subdivisions.21 Consequently, through this legal framework,
municipalities can delegate the job of providing affordable housing to
private developers.22
A. The MPDU Program’s Legal and Demographic Context
Like other mandatory inclusionary housing initiatives, the MPDU
program requires private developers of market–rate subdivisions to set
aside some units for low–income individuals.23 Its goals include expanding
affordability and rectifying past instances of racial housing
discrimination.24 This is accomplished under section 25A of the
Montgomery County Code, which provides that the County determines the
number of affordable units a developer must build through a ratio.25 While
the ordinance is applicable throughout the County, its requirements for
providing affordable options are confined to a specific subset of private
development, namely, those buildings with thirty–five or more dwelling
units.26 Officials may not grant a building permit to a developer unless he
segregated housing projects).
18. See, e.g., TIM IGLESIAS & ROCHELLE E. LENTO, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORD
ABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 13 (2d ed. 2011) (stating that federal programs such as
the Low–Income Housing Tax Credit worked to modify the behavior of private actors).
19. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 265 (3d ed. 2015)
(discussing how programs designed to promote affordable housing such as inclusionary
housing regulations have shifted from the federal government to the state and local
level).
20. See id. at 283 (“Inclusionary zoning requires or encourages developers to




23. Id. at 287.
24. Rice, supra note 13.
25. See Moderately Priced Housing Law, Montgomery County Code, Md., Code §
25A–5(c)(3) (2017) (requiring that “the number of moderately priced dwelling units is
a variable percentage not less than 12.5% of the total number of dwelling units at that
location”).
26. Id. § 25A–2(5) (stating that “all subdivisions of 35 or more dwelling units
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or she signifies that the building will comply with the ordinance’s
stipulations.27
The Montgomery County Code provides specific requirements regarding
the conditions of affordable units and the cost for residents under the
MPDU program.28 However, it also gives developers a high degree of
autonomy to determine the placement of the affordable units within the
larger development project.29 Consequently, developers often group the
required affordable units together on a side street –– away from the
subdivision’s market–rate dwellings.30
Despite the MPDU’s shortcomings, it has contributed to the increased
racial diversity of Montgomery County.31 According to the Census Bureau,
the County’s white population declined from 49.3% in 2010 to 45.2% in
2015, whereas the Hispanic population increased from 17% in 2010 to 19%
in 2015.32 As a result, the majority of the current population identifies as a
racial or ethnic minority.33
B. Federal Housing Discrimination Standards for Municipal Zoning
Ordinances
In general, the FHA bans housing discrimination due to a person’s race,
religion, gender, or national origin.34 The FHA specifically prohibits
include a minimum number of moderately priced units of varying sizes with regard to
family needs”).
27. Id. §§ 25A–5(a), (g)–(h) (stating that the County enforces these zoning
regulations through written agreements between developers and the Department of
Housing and Community Affairs); see also IGLESIAS & LENTO, supra note 18, at 101
(discussing how the County’s regulations require that the agreement be approved by
both the Director of the County Department of Housing and Community Affairs and
the County Attorney).
28. § 25A–5 (b) (requiring certain developers seeking a building permit to submit a
written agreement approved by the County that establishes legal obligations –– such as
building a specified number of affordable units and to provide three or more bedrooms
for affordable dwellings in single–family subdivisions).
29. Id. § 25A–5B (a)–(b) (stating that a developer of higher–density housing may
fulfill its statutory obligations by building the allotted number of MPDUs on a separate
parcel of land, which demonstrates the statute’s flexible requirements regarding the
placement and physical location of affordable units).
30. See Rice, supra note 13 (discussing how an especially large project in Potomac,
Maryland complied with the MPDU program’s requirements by dividing market–rate
and affordable units into two separate subdivisions).
31. See MONTGOMERY CTY., MD., 2015 ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR
HOUSING CHOICE 24 (2015) (“The MPDU program has resulted in economically and
racially diverse communities throughout the County, expanded housing choice, and
resulted in other desirable public outcomes.”).
32. See id. at 6 (comparing the County’s population between 2010 and 2015).
33. See id..
34. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
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refusing “to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin.”35 Given this statutory language, the FHA provides
potential plaintiffs wide latitude to bring a housing discrimination claim.36
Furthermore, the FHA clearly states that large commercial real estate
entities may be found liable for these types of housing discrimination
claims.37 However, suing a municipality for discriminatory housing laws
or practices has more complex legal foundations. Over several decades of
statutory interpretation, federal regulations, and court opinions have shaped
the legal infrastructure surrounding a municipality’s liability for FHA
violations.38
The primary regulatory body involved in this interpretative process is the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).39
Municipalities receiving federal funds from HUD have a legal obligation to
comply with the FHA and affirmatively further the interests of fair
housing.40 Consequently, a municipal government can be found liable in a
HUD administrative hearing for enacting a discriminatory housing law.41
Similarly, courts have supported an individual plaintiff’s ability to bring
a housing discrimination claim against a municipality as a public actor for
implementing discriminatory housing regulations and zoning ordinances.42
35. Id.
36. Id. § 3604(b) (“To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”); see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 US 205, 209 (1972)
(describing the FHA’s statutory language pertaining to prohibiting housing discrimin
ation as “broad and inclusive”).
37. § 3605(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate–related transactions to discriminate against
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such
a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin.”).
38. See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,461–62 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100) (providing historical and legal background on the FHA’s enactment and
interpretation).
39. § 3608(a).
40. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,477 (“[R]ecipients of HUD funds already must comply
with a variety of civil rights requirements. This includes the obligation . . . under the
Fair Housing Act to affirmatively further fair housing in carrying out HUD programs;
and HUD program rules designed to foster compliance with the Fair Housing Act and
other civil rights laws.”).
41. See generally id.
42. See, e.g., Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding a municipality liable for housing discrimination); United States v. City
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For instance, in United States v. Yonkers Board of Education,43 the
municipality’s regulations regarding the geographic placement of
subsidized housing amounted to a form of race–based housing
discrimination.44 By almost exclusively placing low–income housing in
heavily minority neighborhoods, the local government’s zoning decisions
had the effect of perpetuating racial segregation, which amounted to a form
of illegal housing discrimination.45
Additionally, courts permit the use of the disparate impact doctrine and
the disparate treatment doctrine as alternative methods of pursuing housing
discrimination claims under the FHA.46 The disparate impact doctrine
focuses on whether the a practice has a “disproportionately adverse effect
on minorities” while the disparate treatment doctrine focuses on whether
there is a discriminatory intent.47 In other words, disparate impact claims
concentrate on discriminatory results of practices and policies, while
deemphasizing the issue of discriminatory purpose.48 In this way, disparate
impact claims allow claimants to avoid the onerous burden of proving
intent.49 All that is necessary to demonstrate a discriminatory effect under
the disparate impact doctrine, is a showing that (1) the ordinance
perpetuates residential segregation or (2) the government action at issue
disproportionately affects a protected class.50
of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Otero v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 484
F.2d 1122, 1133–34 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[A]n authority may not . . . select sites for
projects which will be occupied by non–whites only in areas already heavily
concentrated with a high proportion of non–whites, . . . . [Because] Congress’ desire in
providing fair housing throughout the United States was to stem the spread of urban
ghettos and to promote open, integrated housing”).
43. 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1988).
44. Id. (finding a § 3604 violation due to the practice of constructing subsidized
housing in predominantly minority neighborhoods).
45. See id. at 1226 (“[T]he City may properly be held liable for the segregative
effects of a decision to cater to this ‘will of the people.’”).
46. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015); see also THE LEGALGUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOP
MENT 65 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2006) (“There are three principal
theories by which a local land–use ordinance can be found to have violated the FHA:
(1) intentional discrimination, (2) disparate impact, or . . . (3) failure to provide
reasonable accommodation.”).
47. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
48. See, e.g., id. (stating that a housing practice is discriminatory under disparate
impact if it has a disproportionately adverse impact upon a protected class).
49. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
50. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that based on a local regulatory action relating to housing was
discriminatory because it disproportionately affected a racial minority group in a
negative manner); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 US 205, 221 (1972)
(finding that losing the social and economic benefits associated with living in a racially
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For example, in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington,51 plaintiffs
filed suit against a municipality for discriminatory housing practices under
the FHA’s theory of disparate impact.52 In Huntington, the primary issue
was whether a predominantly suburban white community’s regulatory
practice of physically separating housing disproportionately occupied by
racial minorities violated the FHA.53 The court explained that under the
disparate impact doctrine, the challenged practice must “actually or
predictably [result] in racial discrimination” or, in other words, have a
discriminatory effect, and therefore, it is unnecessary to show that it was
made with a discriminatory intent.54 A discriminatory effect arises where:
(1) there is an adverse impact on a particular minority group and (2) there
is harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.55
The court held that the zoning ordinance had a discriminatory effect
because it impeded integration by restricting low–income housing needed
by minorities to an area that was already mostly inhabited by minorities,
which significantly perpetuated segregation.9
On the other hand, the court in Dews v. Sunnyvale,56 utilized both a
disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis. In that case, the claim
brought against a municipality centered on the discriminatory impact of its
low–density zoning restrictions.57 The court first considered whether there
was a discriminatory effect under the disparate impact doctrine.58 It found
that there was a discriminatory effect where the zoning restrictions
excluded racial minorities by prohibiting the construction of multi–family
housing that would have been disproportionally occupied by African
Americans.59 The court then considered whether there was a
discriminatory intent under the disparate treatment doctrine.60 Under the
integrated environment is a valid injury for a plaintiff to allege).
51. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 928.
53. See id. (discussing how the subject of the court’s legal analysis pertained to
whether the town’s practice of placement housing projects –– largely occupied by
racial minorities –– in a separate “urban renewal area” amounted to a discriminatory
housing practice that contradicted the FHA’s policy goal of promoting racial
integration).
54. Id. at 934.
55. Id. at 937–38.
56. 109 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
57. Id. at 529.
58. Id. at 572–73.
59. See id. at 526 (“It is these zoning laws, allegedly enacted by the residents of
Sunnyvale to preserve their rural lifestyle, which are being challenged by Plaintiffs on
the grounds that they were enacted with . . . an effect which falls disproportionately on
African–Americans looking for housing in the Dallas Metropolitan Area.”).
60. Id.
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disparate treatment doctrine, there is a discriminatory intent where (1) the
defendant’s stated reasons for its decision are pretextual and (2) there is a
reasonable inference that race was a significant factor in the refusal.61 To
determine whether there is a discriminatory intent, courts consider: “(1)
discriminatory impact; (2) the historical background of the challenged
decision; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision; (4)
any procedural and substantive departures from the norm; and (5) the
legislative or administrative history of the decision.”62 The court held that
the zoning restrictions were done with discriminatory intent.
In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project,63 the Court held that under the FHA, both the
disparate impact and disparate treatment doctrines can support a
discriminatory housing claim.64 Here, a nonprofit organization made a
housing discrimination claim against Texas regarding its interpretation of a
low–income tax credit statute.65 The Court found that the plaintiff could
rely on statistical evidence to support that there was a discriminatory effect
pursuant to its disparate impact claim.66 Otherwise, plaintiffs would need
to rely on the disparate treatment doctrine, which required plaintiffs to
provide documentation regarding a practice’s discriminatory intent, which
was not present in that case.67 The Court created a three part, burden–
shifting test for a disparate impact claim.68 First, the plaintiff must make a
prima facie case that there is a disparate impact.69 Specifically, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that “a challenged practice caused or predictably will
61. Id. at 532.
62. Id. at 533.
63. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
64. Id. (affirming the validity of using disparate impact claims under the Fair
Housing Act, which may consequently empower more potential litigants to file
disparate impact claims against municipalities for engaging in discriminatory housing
practices). But see Alana Semuels, Supreme Court vs. Neighborhood Segregation,
ATLANTIC (June 25, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/
supreme-court-inclusive-communities/396401/ (arguing that the long–term status of
disparate impact is uncertain, because the Court’s majority opinion cautioned against
using race–based quotas as a remedy).
65. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
66. Id. at 2514.
67. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: A Civil Rights Law Made Broader, But
Not Too Broad, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2015 12:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-a-civil-rights-law-made-broader-but-not-too-broad/
(describing how the holding functioned as a compromise between Justice Kennedy and
the more liberal wing of the Court, because it cautioned against excessive litigation but
still preserved the fundamentals of disparate impact as a litigation strategy).
68. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
69. Id.
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cause a discriminatory effect.”70 Second, the burden shifts to the defendant
to “prov[e] that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”71 Finally, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that “the substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”72 By
validating the use of disparate impact in the context of the FHA, the Court
provided two distinct, but equal causes of action for potential plaintiffs
under the disparate impact and disparate treatment doctrines.73
C. Statutory Changes to New York’s 421–a Program
New York City’s 421–a Program provides tax incentives for developers
to include affordable units in their market–rate apartment buildings.74 The
421–a program is purely voluntary for developers; it offers optional tax
benefits to developers in exchange for providing affordable options.75
Over the past few years, the 421–a program’s lack of regulatory
restrictions regarding a specific housing practice became a highly contested
issue.76 Until recently, developers receiving 421–a tax incentives could
physically separate an apartment building’s affordable units from its
market–rate dwellings.77 Although developers built both affordable and
market–rate units within a single structure, the affordable units were placed
in isolated floors and the residents had separate accommodations.78 Here,
the most infamous design feature is the separate entrance provided for low–
income residents.79 The separate entrances are now almost ubiquitously
labeled “poor doors.”80 In response, many in the region condemned the
70. Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2014)) (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id. at 2515 (quoting § 100.500(c)(2)).
72. Id. (quoting § 100.500(c)(3)).
73. See generally id.
74. See generally N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421–a (McKinney 2015) (allowing
developers of multi–unit residential buildings in cities with over a million people in the
State of New York to forgo local taxes for up to three years for making twenty percent
of the units affordable for low–income people).
75. Id. (stating that developers can renounce or terminate participation and provid-
ing tax exemptions for newly constructed multiple–unit residential buildings that
include lower–cost housing options).
76. See generally Mireya Navarro, ‘Poor Door’ in a New York Tower Opens a
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practice of building poor doors.81
Following public outcry, the New York Legislature enacted statutory
changes with added language pertaining to poor doors.82 Under this new
provision in the 421–a statute, people living in these affordable units must
share the same entrances and common areas with the occupants of market–
rate units.83 The provision also prohibits developers from isolating these
affordable units to a specific floor or area of a building.84 If a developer
fails to comply with these requirements, it is not eligible to receive 421–a’s
tax incentives for providing mixed–income housing.85
III. ASSESSING THEVIABILITY OF A POTENTIALDISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIM AND THE COMPATIBILITY OF A POSSIBLE STATUTORY REFORM
A. Determining the Likelihood of a Successful Disparate Impact
Claim Against Montgomery County Under the FHA
The FHA’s legal structure may allow a plaintiff to bring a housing
discrimination claim against Montgomery County based on the MPDU
program’s regulatory practices.86 A concern for a potential Montgomery
County plaintiff is that he or she may lack a substantial basis for arguing
that there was a discriminatory intent in creating the MPDU program
pursuant to the disparate treatment doctrine.87 However, a plaintiff may be
able to make a successful claim pursuant to the disparate impact doctrine.88
Consequently, the primary legal issue to resolve involves a focus on
applying the legal framework of disparate impact and investigating possible
80. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, NYC Bans ‘Poor Doors’ – Separate Entrances for
Low-Income Tenants, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015) (describing the poor door
controversy and the statutory changes that followed outrage over the practice’s
perceived unfairness and cruelty).
81. See id. (“Though such a system might smack of Victorian England — or worse,
the Jim Crow South or apartheid South Africa — plans for it existed in New York City
until last week.”).
82. See id. (describing how the Mayor of New York City added language in a bill
that was passed by the state legislature).
83. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421–a(7)(d)(ii) (McKinney 2015) (“[A]fford
able units shall share the same common entrances and common areas as market rate
units, and shall not be isolated to a specific floor or area of a building.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (stating that disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act
are often used against municipalities with discriminatory housing ordinances).
87. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., 2015 ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUS
ING CHOICE, supra note 31.
88. See generally Dews v. Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
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avenues for making a successful claim on these grounds. The following
sections will evaluate the three part Inclusive Communities test to
demonstrate that MPDU is vulnerable to a housing discrimination claim.89
i. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact
To make a successful disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must first
make an initial showing that a housing practice has a discriminatory effect
upon a protected class of individuals.90 Particularly, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a housing practice either (1) institutes a form of
segregation or (2) disproportionately effects a protected class in a negative
manner.91 These avenues for proving a discriminatory effect can be more
concisely referred to as the segregation–based and disproportionate effect
approaches.
The segregation–based approach is more advantageous in those
circumstances where the discriminatory effect is less clearly defined.92
Under this approach, the discriminatory effect is racial segregation, which
impermissibly deprives litigants of the social and economic benefits of
integration, while also compromising the dignity of the population being
segregated.93 Thus, this approach is centered around the generalized
benefits of integration and the injury is interrelated and mutually connected
to the act of physical separation based on race.94 However, an argument
under this approach may be difficult to make if there are not enough facts
to demonstrate segregation is actually occurring.95
This segregation–based approach offers the strongest basis for
establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie disparate impact claim in a suit
against Montgomery County. Montgomery County’s zoning ordinance
permits developers to separate affordable units from market–rate dwellings,
89. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2514–15.
90. See, e.g., id. (discussing how a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse impact on
a certain community).
91. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.
1988) (“The discriminatory effect of a rule arises in two contexts: adverse impact on a
particular minority group and harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of
segregation.”).
92. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1186 (2d Cir. 1988)
(showing how such an approach may be used); see also Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct.
of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the nature of this approach’s
burden of proof); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 , 565 (6th Cir. 1981).
93. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
94. See generally id.
95. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 928 (finding that a practice satisfied the burden of
proof under a discriminatory effects model, but it could not have met the requirements
under the segregation–based approach, because the practice was less clearly connected
to the outcome of increasing segregation).
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two forms of housing with starkly different racial compositions.96 Thus,
these housing practices can foster racial segregation. This racial
segregation deprives the occupants of both affordable and market–rate units
from the social and economic benefits of integration.97 Therefore, a
plaintiff could establish a prima facie disparate impact claim under the
segregation–based approach.
The disproportionate effect approach may also provide a successful,
though more problematic, avenue for a successful prima facie disparate
impact claim. This approach requires a showing on two fronts: the action
at issue must (1) disproportionately impact a protected class and (2) place a
negative burden on that class.98 A potential plaintiff suing the County for
its MPDU program has a strong basis for satisfying the first component,
because there is strong statistical evidence supporting the notion that a
disproportionate number of MPDU program participants are racial
minorities, compared to the County at large.99
However, the grounds for proving the negative burden on the protected
class are more difficult. The disproportionate effects approach requires a
more concrete showing of an injury.100 Essentially, the plaintiff must prove
that the housing program resulted in a substantial harm to the protected
class.101 If the grounds for claiming a harm run in conjunction with clear
social benefits, like greater social and economic opportunities, the
argument could expose the plaintiff to a higher risk of judicial skepticism
and pushback from the defense.102
If the disproportionate effect approach is used in a housing
discrimination case against Montgomery County, a potential plaintiff
would need to prove that separating MPDU units from market–rate
96. See, e.g., Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 205 (holding that a regulation discriminatory
under similar circumstances for depriving residents from enjoying the benefits of racial
integration).
97. See id.
98. See Dews v. Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding a
practice discriminatory after the plaintiff demonstrated that the practice
disproportionately impacted a protected class and placed a negative burden on that
class).
99. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration:
Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 79 (2001).
100. See id.
101. THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 46, at
66 (stating that a showing of an adverse impact must be made, along with the statistical
evidence).
102. Cf. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating that if the defendant is a municipality, it can make a showing that the
discriminatory practice serves an important government interest to invalidate the
claim).
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dwellings creates a substantial harm.103 If the argument relies on
demonstrating how the separation inflicts an economic or social harm,
opposing counsel could respond by highlighting the economic benefits that
the program provides to low–income residents.104 However, while a
municipality may provide a predominantly minority community with a
form of social assistance like subsidized housing, it would still deprive
them of racial integration’s benefits.105 When assessing the disproportionate
effect, evidence of both a program’s costs and benefits are more difficult to
ascertain, making the harm more difficult to distinguish and accentuate.106
While other arguments may be available, these constraints and risks make
the disproportionate effect approach a less likely route for pursuing a claim
against Montgomery County. Therefore, a potential plaintiff is more likely
to utilize the segregation–based approach in a disparate impact claim.
ii. Defendant’s Burden of Demonstrating Substantial, Legitimate,
Nondiscriminatory Interest
After determining that a prima facie disparate impact claim has been
established, the next step is to consider whether Montgomery County has a
legitimate purpose for the housing separation.107 In general, the County has
a strong basis for satisfying its burden of proof because the MPDU
program was intended to promote diversity and increase the area’s
economic accessibility.108 Thus, the County may be able to argue that
permitting housing separation in the MPDU program is essential for
supporting its core mission.109
Furthermore, the County could claim that granting developers the
discretion to engage in housing separation helps sustain demand for
market–rate homes.110 First, housing separation helps assuage the fears of
those wealthy buyers who may be uncomfortable living in a mixed–income
103. THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 46, at
66.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1186 (2d Cir. 1988).
106. THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 46, at
67.
107. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939 (“Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing
of discriminatory effect, a defendant must present bona fide and legitimate
justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternatives available.”).
108. See, supra note 31 (stating that the intent behind the County’s inclusionary
housing program was to promote diversity and increase the area’s economic
accessibility).
109. Id.
110. See generally Beyer, supra note 10.
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environment.111 Second, mixed–income subdivisions could damage the
perceived exclusivity and status of the market–rate units, which would in
turn result in high–end buyers avoiding the project.112 Consequently, the
project would be less profitable, because the lack of demand may depress
real estate values.113 As a result, permitting housing separation creates
higher profits for developers and a greater willingness for them to build
subdivisions subject to the MPDU program’s affordable housing
requirements.114
iii. Plaintiff’s Burden of Demonstrating a Less Discriminatory
Alternative
Finally, the plaintiff can undermine Montgomery County’s stated interest
by presenting a less discriminatory alternative that still serves the County’s
interest. As will be described below, New York’s 421–a program’s poor
door ban would be a suitable alternative to the MPDU program.
Consequently, all three parts of the Inclusive Communities test have been
met, which can support a successful housing discrimination claim under the
FHA.
B. Comparing Montgomery County’s MPDU Program to New York’s
421–a Program
Given the MPDU program’s vulnerability to a successful housing
discrimination claim, it is worth considering whether an urban
municipality’s statutory solution to housing separation could work in a
suburban context like Montgomery County. For the MPDU program to
adopt a housing separation ban resembling the 421–a program’s statutory
changes, the statutory structures of both programs must be sufficiently
compatible. If there is a strong enough resemblance between the two
programs, it is likely that it would be possible to apply the poor door ban to
the MPDU program.
Although there are clear distinctions between a tax incentive program
and a zoning regulation, both programs promote forms of inclusionary
housing.115 Given this common goal, the programs share similar
111. See id.
112. See Emily Badger, When Separate Doors for the Poor Are More Than They
Seem, WASH. POST (July 31, 2014) (discussing how some owners of market–rate units
don’t want to live near affordable units).
113. Id.
114. See Moderately Priced Housing Law, Montgomery County Code, Md., Code §
25A (2017).
115. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421–a (McKinney 2015) (outlining the
exemptions for various types of new dwellings); Moderately Priced Housing Law,
Montgomery County Code, Md., Code § 25A (2017) (assessing the need for
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approaches to increasing the number of affordable units within a
jurisdiction.116 They are both market–oriented legal mechanisms that
modify the private real estate market with regulatory incentives or
requirements.117
These programs are also similar in the context of housing separation. By
concentrating the occupants of affordable units on a separate side street,
developers in Montgomery County create physical and social divisions
between the occupants of subsidized units and market–rate units.118 In this
way, the MPDU program permits a form of separation that resembles the
practice of creating poor doors in urban apartment buildings.119
Additionally, housing separation in a suburban context can, in some ways,
operate in a more subtle and nefarious manner because these settings offer
more physical space to isolate and conceal low–income housing.120
Therefore, the parallels between the inclusionary housing regulations in
New York and Montgomery County demonstrate that the recent changes to
the 421–a program are compatible in Montgomery County. Thus,
Montgomery County could similarly require developers to provide
common entrances for both affordable and market–rate units. In this
instance, a common point of entry would be the road providing access to
the subdivision. Similar to the 421–a program requirement that affordable
and market–rate apartments share the same floor,121 the MPDU program
can require developers to place affordable dwellings within the same cul–
de–sacs as market–rate homes in an evenly distributed manner.
IV. MONTGOMERY COUNTY SHOULD IMPLEMENT A SAME STREET
STIPULATION
Enacting regulatory changes to the MPDU program resembling New
York’s poor door ban is both a legally feasible and advisable option for
Montgomery County. As described above, the similarities between these
two forms of housing separation demonstrate that Montgomery County can
moderately priced housing in Montgomery County, Maryland and offering alternative
solutions for suitable housing for multiple income houses).
116. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 283 (discussing how both mandatory or
incentives based inclusionary housing programs work off the statutory model of zoning
ordinances).
117. Id.
118. See generally Rice, supra note 13 (highlighting the divide created between
incomes in the community by offering housing at market rate with subsidies for the
poor).
119. Moyer, supra note 80 (discussing how “poor doors” work to physically
separate people of different class backgrounds).
120. See generally id.
121. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421–a(7)(d)(ii) (McKinney 2015).
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use New York’s methodology in a suburban context.122
While banning poor doors may look different in a suburban context, it
still serves the same purpose of creating common entrances for subsidized
and market–rate units.123 By adding a same street stipulation in Chapter§ 25
of the Montgomery County Code, the County could ensure that there are
common access points for all residents.124 This same street stipulation
would state, “[a]ffordable units shall share the same common entrances and
common areas, including roads and sidewalks, as market rate units.” For
example, developers could then place affordable dwellings within the same
cul–de–sacs as market–rate homes in a more evenly distributed manner.
Due to the greater number of physical factors at play when designing a
subdivision, including the street design and the positioning of detached
dwellings,125 the County could add additional compliance requirements
onto its current zoning approval process.126 If a developer’s plan fails to
reasonably incorporate and integrate affordable units within the
subdivision’s design, the County would have the power to reject the
application and ask for revisions. While considering this extra regulatory
factor may slow down the housing approval process, it could also foster a
more cooperative process between these private and public entities.
However, this oversight may stymie new development if businesses find
these additional procedures prohibitively bureaucratic.127 Therefore, the
best solution may be to implement the statutory reforms with an additional
oversight process, but make participation in the supplementary compliance
process purely voluntary.128 To encourage participation, Montgomery
County could offer limited tax incentives to developers that satisfy the
additional compliance requirements.
Additionally, given the Court’s recent holding in Inclusive Communities
and the limited budgets that local governments have available to pay legal
fees, municipalities should prohibit housing separation as a precaution.129
122. See generally id. § 421–a; Moderately Priced Housing Law, Montgomery
County Code, Md., Code § 25A (2017).
123. See generally Rice, supra note 13.
124. See generallyMoyer, supra note 80.
125. See generally Rice supra note 13.
126. See generally Moderately Priced Housing Law, Montgomery County Code,
Md., Code § 25A (2017).
127. Cf. Jawhar Sircar, The Bureaucracy Is Ailing, TELEGRAPH, https://www.tele
graphindia.com/1170914/jsp/opinion/story_172999.jsp (lasted visited Sept. 25, 2017)
(describing how excessive bureaucracy can have negative business consequences).
128. See generally id.
129. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2514–15 (2015).
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Housing separation deprives the occupants of affordable units from the
potential opportunity to socialize with people from more economically
advantaged backgrounds and implies that they are undesirable neighbors.130
Therefore, by permitting this practice, jurisdictions are, in effect, endorsing
a regulation that imputes inferiority upon the occupants of those affordable
units on a symbolic and actual basis.131
In this way, metropolitan areas, including urban centers and the
surrounding suburbs, could empower low–income individuals to make their
own decisions about where to live in a manner that may be more politically
palatable.132 That said, this type of solution would only work in a city with
a strong real estate market and high demand for market–rate units.133
Otherwise, this tax–based approach may just further exacerbate an area’s
housing problems by discouraging construction and restricting the overall
housing supply.134 It is important that housing policymakers devote more
attention to this issue to avoid perpetuating the kind of segregation that
many have fought hard to prevent.
CONCLUSION
Montgomery County’s mandatory inclusionary housing program permits
a form of housing separation. This practice raises issues pertaining to FHA
compliance under the disparate impact doctrine. Montgomery County may
be susceptible to a lawsuit, because the County permits a discriminatory
housing practice that deprives a protected class of individuals from
enjoying the benefits of integration.135 Consequently, banning housing
separation is a prudent legal precaution for local governments and fosters a
less uncertain business environment. Instead, Montgomery County should
implement a same street stipulation resembling New York’s poor door ban.
130. Tanvi Misra, Fair Housing Faces an Uncertain Fate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2017/02/fair-housing-faces-an-uncertain-
fate/515133/?utm_source=atlfb.
131. See generally id.
132. See generally Rice, supra note 13.
133. See generally id.
134. See generally id.
135. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 283.
